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A survey of 103 sugarcane farmers on the KwaZulu-Natal coast was conducted in 
order to analyse the impact of the Sectoral Determination for Farm Workers (2002) on 
South African agriculture. The sample was separated into a high wage paying North 
Coast and lower wage paying South Coast. Typically farmers were unable to 
distinguish between the impact of the Sectoral Determination and other labour laws. 
Results indicate that the impact of the legislation is similar in each region. No 
respondents reported mass retrenchment, but job shedding is disguised by not 
replacing workers (especially unskilled workers) that leave the farm. A sizeable 
number of growers (17 per cent on the South Coast and 44 per cent on the North 
Coast) have reduced the working week to 27 hours (or 36 hours in the Felixton Mill 
Group Area) enabling them to pay wages on an hourly, rather than a weekly basis. 
This strategy reduces the effective wage. About 40 per cent of growers have reduced 
the in-kind benefits to their workers. About half of respondents indicated that they are 
likely to increase their use of seasonal and contract labour in future. Although a 
majority of respondents indicated that they considered mechanisation of the harvesting 
process, cost and topographical factors currently does not make this a serious 
alternative to manual harvesting. However, because of increased wage costs and the 
relatively strong currency in recent years, chemical weed control has become an 




In 2002 the Minister of Labour introduced minimum wages and minimum 
conditions of employment in the South African agricultural sector by means of 
the Sectoral Determination for Farm Workers (Department of Labour, 2002). 
The intervention was predicated on the view that farm workers are the 
“lowest paid and most marginalised workers in South Africa” (Kassier et al, 
2003:7). 
 
The Sectoral Determination establishes a minimum wage rate that varies 
between two areas (A and B) and includes annual increases of the minimum 
                                                 




legislated wage. Per capita gross geographic product (GGP) was used as the 
criterion for subdividing the country into Areas A and B, with Area A having 
a higher per capita GGP and Area B a lower per capita GGP. Other than 
minimum wage requirements, the Sectoral Determination imposes a number 
o f  o t h e r  c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  s e e k  t o  a d d r ess past inequalities and injustices 
associated with agricultural employment.1 
 
The aim of this paper is investigate the impact of the Sectoral Determination 
on the sugar cane industry. The South African sugar industry utilises about 
434 000 hectares of land, primarily in KwaZulu-Natal and to a lesser extent in 
Mpumalanga. The industry produced a total crop of 2.4 million tonnes of 
sugar in the 2003/04 season, and employs about 55 000 labourers in primary 
production (South African Canegrowers, 2003/04). 
 
The study is based on a survey of 103 medium-sized and large commercial 
farms in KwaZulu-Natal. Of these, 60 were from the South Coast (which 
primarily pay the lower Area B wages) and 43 from the North Coast (which 
pay Area A and B wages in equal proportions).   
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a short literature review 
on the expected impact of minimum wage legislation and some previous 
empirical results. Section 3 discusses the research methodology and the 
rationale for dividing the sample into the South Coast and North Coast. In 
section 4 the impact of the Sectoral Determination (and other relevant labour 
legislation) on wage structures, labour structures and labour/capital ratios 
amongst the sampled farmers is discussed. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature  Review 
 
Standard economic theory suggests that the introduction of a minimum wage 
would decrease employment and increase unemployment. A binding 
minimum wage, set above the market clearing wage, increases the cost of 
labour. Firms demand less labour, while more labour is supplied as new 
entrants want to take advantage of the higher wage. As the marginal cost of 
labour increases above the marginal productivity (of at least some workers), 
firms reduce their workforces. 
 
The agricultural sector has been shedding jobs for a long period before the 
Sectoral Determination was introduced in 2002. According to Payne et al. 
(1990) agricultural employment had been decreasing at an average annual rate 
of 1.2 per cent between 1970 and 1990. A further 20 per cent of agricultural 
workers lost their jobs between 1990 and 1996 (Conradie, 2003, quoting the Agrekon, Vol 46, No 1 (March  2007)  Murray & Van Walbeek 
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Department of Labour, 2001). The sugar growing industry was not immune 
from this trend of labour shedding. Employment decreased at an average 
annual rate of about one per cent between 1973/74 and 2003/04 (South 
African Canegrowers, 2003/04). Changes in the sugar pricing structure in 1998 
have stimulated the planting of sugar cane and have resulted in a reversal in 
the employment trends (Murray, 2006: 47-48). Since the late 1990s there has 
been a slight increase in employment in sugar cane production. 
 
There is substantial empirical support, both in the international and South 
African literature, for the traditional view that the introduction of minimum 
wages in the agricultural sector reduces employment. Lianos (1972), Gardner 
(1972) and Gallasch (1975) found that the extension of the Fair Labour 
Standards Act to cover agricultural workers and introduce minimum wages 
reduced total farm employment in the US. Watanabe (1976: 345), in a study on 
minimum wages in developing countries, concluded that “it seems undeniable 
that rapid wage increases will have negative employment effects”. More 
recent studies from a variety of developed and developing countries generally 
came to a similar conclusion (Castillo-Freeman and Freeman, 1992, Partridge 
and Partridge, 1999, Zavodny, 2000, Rama, 2001 and Gindling and Terrell, 
2005).2 
 
A number of South African studies have investig ated the impa ct of labour 
legislation on employment in the agricultural industry. Goedecke and 
Ortmann (1993), Vandeman et al. (1991) and Newman et al. (1997) found that 
contract labour replaced permanent labour when labour legislation was 
introduced. According to them, farmers perceived the shift towards contract 
labour as beneficial since their role as employer is concealed, as the contractor 
now represents the employer. This concealment protects the farmer from 
sanctions imposed by society’s laws and regulations (Polopolus and Emerson, 
1991). Also, making use of contractors economises on enforcement and 
information costs (Roumasset and Uy, 1980), allowing the contractor to benefit 
from economies of scale, which are transferred to the farmer.  
 
Other than the substitution of contract labour for permanent labour, Newman 
et al. (1997) showed that the introduction of the minimum wage resulted in a 
substitution of machinery for labour, resulting in more capital-intensive 
production techniques. In contrast, Simbi and Aliber (2000:5) proposed that 
the “labour-saving, capital-using” nature of the technological change, labour 
shedding and the casualisation of labour in South Africa is not driven 
primarily by increasing real wages, labour scarcity, or the falling real cost of 
capital. Rather, they argue that non-economic factors, such as growers’ fear of 




manage than “prior to 1994”, is driving the process of capital deepening in the 
agricultural sector (Simbi and Aliber, 2000:4). 
 
In labour economics there exists a literature that aims to show that, under 
certain conditions, e.g. monopsony power by the employer, the introduction of 
a minimum wage may in fact increase employment (Lal, 1995 and Cubitt and 
Heap, 1999). While this may be true of some industries, the sugar growing 
industry is too atomised and geographically dispersed for this to be a serious 
hypothesis. 
 
Recent research by Conradie (2003 and 2005), performed after the 
implementation of the statutory minimum wages in South Africa, found that 
grape growers in the Breede River Valley had adjusted quickly to the new 
legislation. Most farmers offered wages above the minimum wage. While she 
found no evidence of job shedding, there was a slowdown in job creation. 
Conradie (2005) found that, despite an increase in the minimum wage at a rate 
above the inflation rate, the increase was unlikely to result in significant job 
losses, although seasonal workers are more at risk than permanent labour. The 
fact that the wine industry was doing well financially enabled farmers to pay 
the higher real wages without significantly cutting back on employment. 
However, she also found that growers offset the wage increase by providing 
fewer benefits.   
 
Investigating the impact of the minimum wages on mechanisation, Conradie 
(2003 and 2005) found no evidence that tractors and labour were substitutes, 
or that grape harvesters reduced employment. 
 
3.  Research methodology and preliminary data analysis 
 
In order to determine the impact of the Sectoral Determination on the South 
African sugar industry a series of semi-structured interviews were conducted 
during January to March 2005, based on a questionnaire developed by 
Conradie (2003). Each of the 103 interviews lasted approximately one hour. 
Ninety-one interviews were conducted with ‘large scale commercial’ growers, 
while twelve were conducted with ‘medium scale’ emerging farmers. The 
latter group are growers that have benefited from the Black Economic 
Empowerment initiative and the downsizing of sugar estates owned by large 
corporate millers. 
 
Given some bad press publicity in the past, many farmers were initially 
reluctant to talk about labour issues. However, using the primary researcher’s 
contacts in the sugar industry, it was possible to obtain a sizeable sample Agrekon, Vol 46, No 1 (March  2007)  Murray & Van Walbeek 
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through references and industry contacts. Nearly all farmers (at least 95 per 
cent) who were contacted agreed to being interviewed. However, given the 
design of the sample, it is not random. In particular, it does not adequately 
represent small-scale growers. 
 
The initial aim was to select approximately half the respondents from higher-
wage Area A and the other half from lower-wage Area B, to establish the 
different reactions to the Sectoral Determination in the two areas. This 
approach was thwarted as a sizeable number of Area A growers (29 of 54) 
have successfully applied for dispensation to pay the Area B wage. As a result, 
only 25 growers in the sample pay the Area A wage, while 78 growers pay the 
Area B wage.  
 
The interviews were conducted in four different mill group areas: Umzimkulu 
and Sezela on the South Coast, Felixton on the North Coast and Eston in the 
Midlands. The Midlands growers were grouped with the South Coast growers 
due to historical precedent.3 During the course of the interviews it became 
apparent that there are regional variations in responses, in particular between 
South Coast and North Coast growers. The analysis in this paper is focused on 
these regional differences. On this basis the sample can be broken down into 
60 South Coast growers (of which eight are from the Midlands) and 43 North 
Coast growers.  
 
The division along regional lines still allows one to make inferences regarding 
the impact of the Sectoral Determination on the South African sugar industry. 
On the North Coast the growers fall into Area A and B categories in equal 
proportions. On the South Coast growers typically pay Area B wages, either 
because their farms fall in Area B or because they have dispensation to pay 
Area B wages, as is illustrated in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Distribution of minimum wage areas on KwaZulu-Natal South 
and North Coast sugar farms, 2005 
   South Coast  North Coast 
   (n=60)  (n=43) 
Area A  7%   (4)  49% (21) 
Area B  47% (28)  49% (21) 
Dispensation  47% (28)  2%   (1) 
Total  100% (60)  100% (43) 
 
Table 2 illustrates some characteristics of farms on the North and South 




similar. In this sample the South Coast farms are somewhat larger than along 
the North Coast, but the differences are not significant.  
 
Table 2: Labour patterns on sugar farms on the KwaZulu-Natal South and 
North Coasts, 2005 
     South Coast  North Coast 
     (n=60)  (n=43) 
Farm size (hectares)  Average  699  649 
   Median  270  258 
        
Total labour   Average  142  135 
   Median  64  60 
        
Total labour per 100 hectares Average  26  25 
   Median  23  22 
   SD  19  10 
        
Weighted average wage 
(Rand/month)  Average 819* 928* 
   Median  782  824 
   SD  175  296 
        
Proportion of minimum wage 
earners Average  61  51 
   SD  26  29 
* Significantly different to the other region at the 5% level of significance. 
 
Table 2 indicates that the weighted average wage is higher on the North Coast 
than on the South Coast. The higher wages on the North Coast can be ascribed 
to a number of factors. Most obviously, a greater proportion of North Coast 
growers have to pay the higher Area A wage. Also, approximately half of 
workers on North Coast farms earn the minimum wage, while a greater 
percentage of workers on South Coast farms earn the (relatively lower) 
minimum wage. Some respondents suggest that competitive industries 
(especially the booming construction industry) are driving up agricultural 
wages on the North Coast. Furthermore, there is some evidence that the North 
Coast has better agronomic conditions and as a result is more productive, 
resulting in higher wages for labourers. In contrast, many South Coast 
growers indicated that they farmed marginal land, resulting in lower yields 
and were thus unable to pay the higher wage.  
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The differences between the North and South Coast, and how these 
differences have impacted on these two regions’ reaction to the Sectoral 
Determination, are discussed in more detail below. 
 
4.  Impact of the sectoral determination 
 
4.1 Employment  effects 
 
The Sectoral Determination is only one  o f  a  n u m b e r  o f  l a w s  t h a t  h a v e  
significantly impacted agricultural employment, the others being the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act (1983, extended to the agricultural sector in 
1993), the Labour Relations Act (1995), and the Extension of Security and 
Tenure Act (1997). The majority of growers were unable to differentiate the 
impact of a specific piece of legislation on their employment practices. Table 3 
summarises growers’ ex post and intended reactions to the labour legislation. 
The question was “what have you done in the past and what do you intend 
doing to minimise the impact of (a list of labour legislation)?” 
 
Table 3: Growers’ responses to labour legislation in the KwaZulu-Natal 
South and North Coasts, 2005 
   South Coast  North Coast 
   (n=60)  (n=43) 
Cancel new projects  25% (15)*  7% (3)* 
Freeze posts  20% (12)  14% (6) 
Retrench unproductive 
workers 67%  (40)  56%  (24) 
Use contract labour  13% (8)*  35% (15)* 
Mechanise harvesting  15% (9)  19% (8) 
Phase out farm 
accommodation  23% (14)*  37% (16)* 
Train labour  42% (25)*  56% (24)* 
Nothing  12% (7)  7% (3) 
* Significantly different at 5% level of significance. 
 
As predicted by economic theory, a majority of respondents (from both 
regions) indicated that they have retrenched, or intend to retrench, 
unproductive workers. Unfortunately no numbers were given. Importantly, a 
sizeable proportion of respondents, especially on the North Coast, indicated a 
greater focus on training, presumably to increase their labourers’ productivity 
levels. A significantly greater proportion of North Coast respondents indicated 
that they made (or intend to make) more use of contract labour. 




A greater proportion of South Coast growers indicated that they have 
cancelled new projects, frozen posts and retrenched workers than North Coast 
growers. Economic theory suggests that the negative employment effect of the 
Sectoral Determination should be more pronounced on the North Coast, 
where the minimum wage is, on average, higher. The evidence does not bear 
this out. In fact, these results suggest that although the South Coast growers 
are impacted less by the legislation (i.e. they typically pay the lower Area B 
wages), the legislation seems to hav e  h a d  a  b i g g e r  i m p a c t  o n  t h e i r  
employment practices. From this analysis we can conclude, albeit tentatively, 
that factors other than the labour legislation are likely to explain the 
differences in the regions’ employment practices. 
 
Table 4 indicates that about a third of both South Coast and North Coast 
growers have employed new workers in the last year.  The reason for 
employing new workers was high labour turnover, not the creation of new 
posts. 
 
Table 4: Percentage of growers on the KwaZulu-Natal South and North 
Coasts that have employed new workers in 2004 
   South Coast  North Coast 
   (n=60)  (n=43) 
Employed new 
workers  33% (20)  35% (15) 
Not employed new 
workers  58% (35)  65% (28) 
No response  9% (5)  0% (0) 
Total 100%  (60)  100%  (43) 
 
Respondents noted that the main reasons for the high labour turnover were 
death, disability or illness (about 70 per cent of respondents mentioned this 
factor), followed by absconding (35 per cent) and disciplinary action (35 per 
cent). North Coast growers (42 per cent) were significantly more likely to 
dismiss their workers because of disciplinary issues than South Coast growers 
(28 per cent). Other explanations for the high labour turnover included 
resignations (26 per cent), retirements (14 per cent) and retrenchments (14 per 
cent). Other than for disciplinary action, there were no significant regional 
differences in the causes of labour turnover.  
 
Many growers indicated that they are downsizing their labour forces. The 
downsizing of labour forces typically occurs benignly, rather than by mass 
retrenchment. Growers simply do not replace some of the workers that leave 
the farm. In many cases only skilled labourers are replaced. Many respondents Agrekon, Vol 46, No 1 (March  2007)  Murray & Van Walbeek 
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indicated that they often would not replace unskilled labour that left the farm, 
but that they aimed to improve the productivity of the remaining unskilled 
workers. 
 
4.2  Weekly vs. hourly wages 
 
The minimum wage legislation ensures that employees who work more than 
27 hours per week are paid the full monthly wage. For employees who work 
less than 27 hours per week, the legislation mandated a minimum wage of 
R4.47 per hour in Area A and R3.66 per hour in Area B for the period 1 March 
2004 to 28 February 2005. If growers were to shift from a 45 hour week (which 
the Sectoral Determination is premised upon) to a 27 hour work week, Area A 
growers would be able to decrease their workers’ monthly wage from R871.58 
to approximately R523.00. Similarly, Area B growers would be able to decrease 
their workers’ monthly wage from R713.65 to approximately R428.00.4 
 
The option of paying an hourly rate can be analysed from at least two points 
of view. A more cynical approach would be to regard the hourly option as 
“exploitative”, where a farmer tries to extract as much labour as possible in the 
stipulated 27 hour work week, while paying them a wage lower than that 
prescribed in the Sectoral Determination for full-time labourers. On the other 
hand, the hourly rate can be seen as a mechanism aimed at minimising the 
employment impact associated with the Sectoral Determination. 
 
The 27 hour working week was taken a step further by some North Coast 
growers (in the Felixton Mill Group Area) who received dispensation to pay 
the hourly wage up to 36 hours. These growers felt that, because of the heat 
and humidity in their region, their labour was not productive past mid-
morning. Rather than working a 45 hour week, the standard has become a 36 
hour working week, the wages of which are paid on an hourly basis.  
 
Both the 27 and 36 hour working week decrease the marginal cost of the 
employee (relative to a full 45 hour week) and therefore allows the grower to 
retain the employee, who might otherwise have been retrenched. For many 
growers (and workers as well), it is more attractive to employ workers for less 
than a full week than retrenching them. Table 5 illustrates the percentage of 
growers that have underemployed their labour by instituting either a 27 or 36 
hour working week. A greater proportion of North Coast growers have 





Table 5: Percentage of growers on the KwaZulu-Natal South and North 
Coasts who have changed to an hourly wage system  
   South Coast  North Coast 
   (n=60)  (n=43) 
27 hour working 
week  17% (10)*  30% (13)* 
36 hour working 
week  0%   (0)*  14% (6)* 
Total  17% (10)*  44% (19)* 
* Significantly different at 5% level of significance. 
 
4.3 In-kind  benefits 
 
Labour in agriculture traditionally receives a cash wage as well as payments 
in-kind (Newman et al. 1997: 75). These in-kind payments comprise a 
combination of housing, food rations, and protective clothing and sometimes 
transport, funeral assistance, childcare and credit. The Sectoral Determination 
stipulates that employers may deduct a maximum of ten percent of the 
employee’s wage for housing and ten percent for food supplied to the farm 
worker (Department of Labour, 2002: 8). Growers thus have an incentive to 
reduce the in-kind benefits previously provided if they feel that the ten 
percent deduction does not cover the provision of such benefits. Furthermore, 
where certain in-kind benefits were previously supplied “free”, growers may 
now charge for such benefits in order to reduce the cash wage. Conradie (2003: 
10) found that many wine farmers in Worcester utilised the housing deduction 
in order to limit the amount by which their cash wage had to rise. 
 
Respondents were asked whether they had added or removed any in-kind 
benefits since the introduction of the Sectoral Determination. Half of South 
Coast growers and 56 per cent of North Coast growers indicated no change in 
in-kind benefits, as indicated in Table 6. A small percentage indicated an 
increase in in-kind benefits (usually in an attempt to increase productivity or 
out of a sense of social responsibility), while 40 per cent of respondents in both 
regions indicated a reduction in in-kind benefits.  
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Table 6: Percentage of growers on the KwaZulu-Natal South and North 
Coasts that have changed the provision of in-kind benefits 
    South Coast  North Coast 
   (n=60)  (n=43) 
No change   50% (30)  58% (25) 
Increased   10% (6)*  2% (1)* 
Decreased  40% (24)  40% (17) 
 Of which: removed 
housing  5% (3)  2% (1) 
 Of which: removed rations  17% (10)*  30% (13)* 
* Significantly different at 5% level of significance. 
 
The most common benefit that has been removed is the provision of rations, 
especially on the North Coast (30 per cent), and to a lesser extent on the South 
Coast (17 per cent). This seems counterproductive, since respondents pointed 
out that providing labourers with rations served a number of useful functions: 
(1) the employer protects the employee from food inflation, (2) it ensures that 
the employees do not have to travel to purchase food, (3) it generally ensures a 
better and more balanced diet, and (4) it maintains the health and strength of 
the workforce. A number of growers noted that since they had stopped 
providing rations their workers’ productivity had decreased. Also, the higher 
cash wage increased the incidence of discipline issues when the employees’ 
increased spending power was spent on alcohol.  
 
4.4  Changing labour structures 
 
As indicated earlier, the introduction of the Sectoral Determination is 
predicted to change the labour structures of growers. In particular, an increase 
in the wage and transaction costs of labour encourages growers to substitute 
contract and seasonal labour for permanent labour. Contract labourers are not 
employed by the grower but by a labour contractor. The grower, in turn, 
employs the contractor to supply specific labour services, for example, to 
harvest his cane at some predetermined rate per ton. At the time of the survey 
13 per cent of South Coast and 35 per cent of North Coast growers employed 
contractors (not shown in table). Respondents who employed labour 
contractors argued that the main reason for doing so is that the contractors 
reduce the stress of managing labour issues and also reduce the non-wage cost 
of labour. In contrast, growers who did not use contractors quoted the 
additional cost and the loss of control of their operations as the major 
restraints. While the current use of contractors is modest, 58 per cent of North 




increase their use of contractors and seasonal labour in future, as shown in 
Table 7.  
 
Table 7: Predicted changes among KwaZulu-Natal South and North Coast 
sugar farmers in usage of seasonal and/or contract labour 
   South Coast  North Coast 
 (n=59)  (n=43) 
No change in seasonal/contract labour   27% (16)  19% (8) 
Increasing complement of seasonal/contract 
labour  44% (26)*  58% (25)* 
Decreasing complement of 
seasonal/contract labour  29% (17)  23% (10) 
Total   100% (59)  100% (43) 
*Significantly different at 5% level of significance. 
 
Other than the move towards contractors, some growers are making more use 
o f  s e a s o n a l  s t a f f ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  p e r m a n e n t  s t a f f .  S e v e n t e e n  p e r  c e n t  o f  S o u t h  
Coast growers indicated that they were using more seasonal labour while 33 
per cent of North Coast growers indicated the same trend (not shown in table). 
Seasonal labour is cheaper than permanent staff as they are paid an hourly 
rate for up to 27 hours per week. Employing seasonal staff also removes the 
non-wage costs of labour, and problems posed to growers by the Extension of 
Security and Tenure Act. 
 
Seasonal labour does not have the drawbacks that a contractor might have. 
There is no additional “mark-up” cost associated with seasonal staff, and the 
grower is still in control of the quality of work done and the quality of workers 
on the farm. Also, there is a history of growers employing seasonal staff to 
supplement their permanent staff during the harvesting season. 
 
4.5 Capital-labour  substitution 
 
The literature suggests that increased real wage and transaction cost results in 
capital-labour substitution (Payne et al. 1990 and Newman et al. 1997). The 
harvesting of cane is very labour intensive and forms one of the grower’s 
biggest expenses. There are mechanical harvesters available but so far their 
adoption has not been widespread. During the interview process, it became 
evident that apart from combine harvesters, which are rare (only two growers 
indicated owning a combine harvester), growers make use of harvesting aids. 
These are attached to tractors to assist in harvesting. The proportion of 
growers who own or rent a mechanical harvester is illustrated in Table 8. 
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Table 8: Percentage of growers on the KwaZulu-Natal South and North 
Coasts making use of mechanical harvesting, 2005 
   South Coast  North Coast 
   (n=60)  (n=43) 
Do not own or rent a mechanical 
harvester  93% (56)*  84% (36)* 
Own or rent a mechanical harvester 7%  (4)* 16%  (7)* 
Total  100% (60)  100% (43) 
* Significantly different at 5% level of significance. 
 
Table 8 shows that 16 per cent of North Coast growers own or rent mechanical 
harvesters compare d to only 7 per cent of South Coast growers. While the 
i n c i d e n c e  o f  m e c h a n i c a l  h a r v e s t e r s  i s  v e r y  l o w  i n  b o t h  r e g i o n s ,  t h e  h i g h e r  
incidence on the North Coast reflects the topography of the regions, rather 
than a greater influence of Sectoral Determination. Respondents indicated that 
only 43 per cent of South Coast farm area can be harvested mechanically 
compared to 61 per cent of North Coast farm area. The South Coast sugar cane 
often grows on slopes too steep for mechanical harvesting. 
 
Fifty-five per cent of South Coast growers have considered mechanised 
harvesting compared to 65 per cent on the North Coast. The most common 
reasons for not mechanising the harvesting process were cost and topography. 
Some growers’ decision not to move to mechanised harvesting was based on 
social responsibility considerations. They argued that in a labour surplus 
economy it makes no sense to choose a more expensive mechanised harvesting 
system and in so doing put many people out of work.  
 
Those growers that consider mechanised harvesting a viable option have done 
so because of the perceived high cost of labour and poor labour productivity. 
Another common reason given was ‘labour issues’, such as labour 
productivity, discipline and crime. Some growers that do own harvesters 
barely use them but retain them as a warning to their labour that they (the 
workers) are replaceable. 
 
Mechanised harvesting is not the only capital-labour substitution that takes 
place. The increased cost of labour along with the relatively strong currency 
(in recent years) has made chemical control of weeds a more viable alternative 
to hiring seasonal labour. Sixty-one per cent of South Coast and 58 per cent of 
North Coast growers have increased their use of chemicals within the last 
three years. The most common reason given for the increased use of chemicals 
is that it is a cheaper and more effective method of weed control than manual 







By extending the labour legislation to the agricultural sector the government 
aims to address some of the abuse that has occurred in this sector, and to 
afford agricultural workers certain minimum rights. The Sectoral 
Determination aims to supplement the other labour legislation by imposing a 
minimum wage in the agricultural sector, while taking cognizance of existing 
regional differences in agricultural wages. To this end the Sectoral 
Determination classifies the country into a higher-wage Area A and a lower-
wage Area B. The legislation is not rigidly applied. For example, farmers can 
apply for dispensation to pay Area B wages, even though they fall in Area A, 
or they can reduce the work week and pay their labourers at an equivalent 
hourly rate. 
 
The fact of the matter is that practically all legislation has costs - real or 
perceived - associated with them. For the Sectoral Determination, the costs are 
borne by farmers who now have to pay a higher wage and by workers who get 
retrenched because their employer cannot afford to pay the higher wage. The 
beneficiaries of the legislation are those workers who remain in their jobs and 
enjoy the benefit of the higher wage. 
 
The aim of this paper was to investigate the impact of the Sectoral 
Determination on the employment patterns and practices on sugar farms on 
the KwaZulu-Natal North Coast and South Coast. Given differences in per 
capita GGP and historical differences in wage rates between the two regions, 
the minimum wage, as prescribed by the Sectoral Determination, is higher on 
the North Coast than on the South Coast.  
 
It was impossible to establish conclusively whether the North Coast was 
influenced more significantly by the Sectoral Determination than the South 
Coast. Respondents from the South Coast were more likely to cancel new 
projects, freeze posts and retrench unproductive workers. Although numbers 
are not available, this suggests a negative employment effect. Most 
respondents indicated that the decrease in employment occurred “benignly”, 
typically through natural attrition, rather than mass retrenchments.  
 
A greater proportion of North Coast farmers mitigated the impact of the 
Sectoral Determination by paying workers on an hourly basis and employing 
them for either 27 or 36 hours a week, as opposed to the standard 45 hour 
working week. Furthermore, a substantially larger proportion of North Coast 
growers make use of seasonal and/or contract labour and intend using more Agrekon, Vol 46, No 1 (March  2007)  Murray & Van Walbeek 
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contract labour in future. The topology of North Coast farms allows more 
mechanised harvesting. Although only 16 per cent of North Coast farmers 
current own or rent a mechanical harvester, two thirds of growers have 
considered mechanising their harvesting. However, cost considerations and 
topography constraints do not make this a viable option for most growers.  
 
South Coast respondents have been more passive in their response to the 
Sectoral Determination (other than doing the predictable things like freezing 
posts and cancelling new projects) while North Coast respondents have tried 
to escape the legislation’s impact by making more use of seasonal and contract 
labour and getting dispensation to pay their labour on an hourly basis. 
 
Kassier et al. (2003) proposed the eventual fusion of the Area A and Area B 
classification. That proposal has been included in the latest revision of the 
Sectoral Determination for Farm Workers (2006). According to this proposal 
Area B wages will be raised by between 10 and 13 per cent annually between 
2006 and 2008 while Area A wages are increased by 4.7 per cent per cent over 
the same period.5 The result is one minimum wage for both Areas from 1 
March 2008 (Sectoral Determination, 2006: 5).  
 
The revised Sectoral Determination is likely to have a significant impact on 
Area B growers and Area A growers with dispensation to pay Area B wages. 
The intent of the revised legislation is to simplify the rules, remove perceived 
loopholes and remove geographic discrepancies in wages. However, Area B 
farms are often less productive because of less suitable agronomic 
circumstances than Area A farms, and may be less able to absorb sizeable 
wage increases. On average, South Coast growers find themselves at an 
agronomic disadvantage to North Coast growers, which may explain why the 
South Coast has been affected more heavily by the Sectoral Determination 
than the North Coast. There will be increased pressure on growers to find 
creative solutions to the challenges posed by the Sectoral Determination.  
 
The impact of changes in the labour legislation is not felt immediately, but 
rather over a number of years. Too little time has elapsed to determine the full 
impact of the Sectoral Determination. The compression of the minimum wages 
between Areas A and B will have an as yet unknown impact on labour 
patterns, especially in Area B. This paper has investigated the immediate 
impact of the Sectoral Determination. There has been some impact, but, in 
fairness, the impact has been less dramatic than some people may have 
predicted before the implementation of the legislation. However, in due 
course the full impact will become clearer. This is an avenue for further 
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1.  These requirements include the provision that a worker working more than 27 
hours per week must be paid the full monthly wage for the area they fall under. A 
maximum of 20% of their earnings may be deducted from the employee’s wages: 
10% for accommodation and a further 10% for food provided (Department of 
Labour, 2002). The additional provisions serve to ensure an adequate cash wage for 
agricultural labour. 
 
2.  In contrast, Katz and Krueger (1992) and Card and Krueger (1995) found a 
positive relationship between minimum wages and employment. Dickens, Machin 
and Manning (1999:1) found that “minimum wages significantly compress the 
distribution of earnings but do not have a negative impact on employment” in the 
UK. 
 
3.  The Midlands are geographically closer to the South Coast. Previously Midlands 
growers delivered their cane to the Illovo mill on the South Coast, but in 1995 the 
Illovo mill was moved to Eston, to be closer to the source of supply. 
 
4.  For the period 1 March 2006 to 28 February 2007 the monthly minimum wage has 
been set at R994 for Area A and at R885 for Area B. The hourly rates were set at 
R5.10 and R4.54 for the two respective areas (Department of Labour, 2006). 
 
5.  The minimum wages are the following: 
  1 March 2006 –  
28 February 2007 
1 March 2007 –  
29 February 2008 
1 March 2008 –  



















       Source:  Department of Labour, 2006 
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